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National elections in a globalizing world  
 
Regular free elections are a key feature of democracy. Citizens periodically get the 
chance to reward or punish their government for its performance and to choose a new 
direction for their country. National elections are essential for the functioning of 
democracies. However, they can be disruptive for international negotiations taking place 
at the same time. Election campaigns divert time and resources from the negotiations to 
the campaign trail, instill doubts about the future government’s commitment to any deal, 
and keep governments from specifying their negotiation position on unpopular issues, out 
of fear that their electoral opponent at home will use it against them. 
 
Research on the disruptive effect of national elections on international negotiations is 
challenging, since no two international negotiations are alike. They typically differ 
substantially, in terms of the interests represented at the negotiation table, the complexity 
of the issue, and the negotiation’s institutional context. An experimental approach is 
equally problematic, since we cannot simply randomize national elections to study their 
effect on an ongoing international negotiation.  
 
Fortunately, the European Union (EU) turned out to be a close-to-ideal laboratory for our 
purposes. As an information-rich, permanent negotiation forum, it has for the past four 
decades produced a constant stream of independent agreements and data on many related 
factors. During the same time period, its exclusively democratic members held numerous 
elections that, bar a few exceptions, were held on fixed dates. In a survival analysis of the 
over 14,000 proposals for EU laws that were discussed between 1976 and 2006, we 
estimated the probability of a negotiation at the EU level being concluded at a given point 
in time, to gauge whether the chances of reaching conclusion decrease when the 
deliberations coincide with elections in one or more member states. 
 
Our analysis yields a surprisingly large disruptive effect. In the case of elections to the 
German Bundestag, for example, the chances of reaching an agreement on an EU law in 
the sixty days prior to Election Day fell by as much as sixty percent. At a general level, 
we find that close races and elections in large states were the most disruptive. We further 
estimate that in total, national elections might have delayed the introduction of laws by 
more than 6,000 years, compared to a situation without national elections. If we assume 
that EU laws are beneficial to European citizens, then this number signifies opportunity 
costs on a massive scale. 
 
It would, of course, be absurd to infer from our research that national elections should be 
abolished for the sake of international cooperation; citizens’ freedom to choose their own 
rulers is the hallmark of democratic government. We also caution against a crude 
generalization of our results beyond the EU context. The EU is special insofar as its 
enforcement mechanisms are stronger than those of most other international 
organizations, which suggests that its members are less concerned that new governments 
will fail to live up to their predecessors’ commitments. What our research does indicate is 
that politicians would be well-advised to be careful with the timing of elections and 
international negotiations, for they may waste valuable time. 
 Consider the Brexit negotiations between the United Kingdom and the twenty-seven 
remaining EU members about the terms of the British withdrawal. The stakes for a 
successful and timely conclusion of the negotiations are high. In the event of a failure to 
reach an agreement, the EU treaties will automatically cease to apply to the United 
Kingdom, at which point it loses, among other things, access to the EU’s Single Market, 
its Customs Union, and to the Preferential Trade Agreements between the EU and several 
dozen other countries. The negotiations face strict time constraints, since in March of 
2017, Prime Minister Theresa May triggered Article 50—the withdrawal clause—of the 
Treaty on European Union, which set off a two-year countdown within which the 
negotiations will have to be concluded. 
 
In light of our research, it is no exaggeration to say that the timing of the trigger for 
Article 50 was unfortunate. It placed the first half of the negotiations in a year where no 
less than three large states—Germany, France, and the United Kingdom itself—as well as 
the Netherlands, held general or presidential elections. During this time, the politicians of 
these countries became preoccupied with the domestic arena, and the United Kingdom 
government failed to specify a reasonable negotiation stance. Although other factors are 
in play, it is still no surprise that almost one year into the talks (and with barely one year 
remaining), the Brexit talks have made little headway and are dangerously close to 
failing.  
 
With the majority of the world’s countries now governed by democratic regimes and the 
number of international organizations rising, it is important to ask whether – and how – 
the disruptive potential of national elections can be dampened. One option would be to 
delegate negotiations to bureaucrats or conduct them in informal settings away from 
public scrutiny. However, this hardly solves the problem, as international agreements 
ultimately require executive decisions by democratically accountable members of 
government with an incentive to delay unpopular international agreements exactly in 
order eschew accountability. Another option would be for the large democratic members 
of an organization to coordinate the timing of their elections in order to limit the period of 
disruption, although this solution would face constitutional constraints. Meanwhile, the 
clock keeps ticking for the Brexit negotiations, and the Italian general election is just 
around the corner. 
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